

## THE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC GUIDANCE ON ARMY BUDGET SUBMISSIONS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JEFFREY C. POWELL  
United States Army

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050



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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

## **THE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC GUIDANCE ON ARMY BUDGET SUBMISSIONS**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey C. Powell  
United States Army

Professor Harold Lord  
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



## **ABSTRACT**

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The President, Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff routinely publish strategic guidance in the form of the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, National Defense Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review. This paper analyzes the correlation between the guidance contained in these documents on the Army's annual budget submissions. In this analysis Army management decision packages (MDEPs) are grouped according to capability to highlight the linkage between guidance and budget submissions. Lastly, the paper discusses how the Army could better utilize the Planning Programming Budgeting Process to more effectively implement change.



## THE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC GUIDANCE ON ARMY BUDGET SUBMISSIONS

During a recent speech the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Robert M. Gates, stated that he was disappointed military leaders working in the Pentagon were more concerned with completing annual budget submissions than fighting the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary Gates' concern raises an important question. Does the planning, programming, budgeting and execution process (PPBEP) used by the Secretary of the Army provide an effective mechanism for ensuring guidance provided by the President, Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is reflected in resource requests? This paper seeks to answer that question by reviewing the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Military Strategy. This review will include an analysis of the policies and priorities contained within the documents and compare these to the Army's portion of the President's Department of Defense Budget Submission to Congress. After this analysis, impediments to change and suggestions on overcoming those obstacles will be discussed.

The Department of the Army uses PPBEP to formulate budget requests. The purpose of PPBEP is to provide a logical procedure for identifying military goals and objectives, linking requirements to stated goals and objectives, allocating resources according to priorities, justifying resource requests and finally tracking how resourcing decisions resulted in achieving goals and objectives.

The first phase of the process is planning. The Army G3/5/7 is the proponent for the planning phase of PPBEP. During the planning phase, Army planners assess current and emerging threats, roles and missions. They then utilize strategic guidance



including the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, National Defense Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review to guide the work of Program Evaluation Groups (PEGs) who identify requirements (personnel, force structure, facilities, equipment, etc.) needed to mitigate threats and accomplish all assigned roles and missions<sup>1</sup>. The final product of the planning phase is a document called The Army Plan (TAP). Section III of the TAP is the Army Program Guidance Memorandum (APGM). The APGM provides guidance to programmers concerning resource constraints and priorities to be used during the integrated programming and budgeting phase of PPBEP.

The second phase of the process is integrated programming and budgeting. The Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE) and the Director of the Army Budget (DAB) are proponents for this phase of the PPBEP. The DPAE is the lead for all programming issues. During programming, the staff analyzes the Army plan, OSD programming guidance and the integrated priority lists (IPLs) submitted by Combatant Commanders in order to apply resources against roles, missions, and force structure requirements. Since programming provides the bedrock upon which budget submissions are built, this process will be described in detail.

Integrating requirements to insure that the Army is properly resourced is a monumental task. To accomplish this task, the Army aggregates all requirements into a set of Management Decision Packages (MDEP). An MDEP documents capabilities and requirements for a nine year period. Specifically, an MDEP documents the two prior years, the current year, budget year, and five program years<sup>2</sup>. This time period coincides with the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) which OSD submits to OMB



as part of the overall budget submission. An MDEP capability may describe an institution, such as the US Army War College, a piece of equipment, or a unit. Each MDEP has a manager who is responsible for integrating and justifying requirements. It is important to note that every penny spent by the Army is covered by an MDEP. During the decade reviewed the Army used a total of 923 separate MDEPs (See Appendix.)

Just as individual capability requirements are integrated by MDEP managers, MDEPs are integrated by Program Evaluation Groups (PEG). The PEGs are proponents for one of the following six functional areas; manning, training, equipping, organizing, sustaining, and installations. During the integrated programming and budgeting phase the PEGs are responsible for working with the MDEP managers and other stakeholders to insure resource levels of assigned MDEPS are in accordance with received guidance and accurately reflected in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), FYDP and budget submission.

During preparation of the Army's budget, it is the DAB's responsibility to apply real world cost adjustments to the POM and ensure requirements are expressed in the correct appropriation. The Army's budget is then submitted to the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) USD(C) who consolidates service budgets on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. Once the budget is approved by the Secretary of Defense, it is forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for inclusion into the President's annual budget submission to Congress.

In the execution phase, warrants are issued from the Department of Treasury to the USD(C). The USD(C) then apportions funding to the individual services. Once this apportionment of funds is received by the Army, the DAB allocates funding to the major



commands and operating agencies. The DAB then monitors obligations and expenditures throughout the life of the appropriation and makes adjustments to funding levels as appropriate.

Although the complex PPEP produces a budget submission that is rational, justifiable, and executable, the question remains: Do the budgets produced accurately reflect strategic guidance? In an attempt to understand the impact of strategic guidance on the Army's annual budget submission, this report will focus on the following documents: the National Security Strategy mandated by 50 USC 404a, the National Defense Strategy (published twice by the Secretary of Defense), the Quadrennial Defense Review mandated by Title 10 USC 118, and the National Military Strategy mandated by 10 USC 153. The following is a brief description of each of the documents listed above.

As mandated by 50 USC 404a, The National Security Strategy should be published annually. During the previous ten years, however, the President has published the National Security Strategy three times. In the National Security Strategy the President provides Congress with a broad outline of the nation's security strategy as it outlines U.S. national interests, goals and objectives. The National Security Strategy also provides a description of how the administration intends to use all instruments of national power to achieve those stated goals and objectives.

The National Defense Strategy was initiated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and has been published twice to date. The National Defense Strategy provides the military direction on implementing the President's National Security



Strategy. The Secretary of Defense also uses this document to provide input to QDR concerning manning, equipping, and training of the services.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is published by the Secretary of Defense every four years. The QDR is a comprehensive examination of the National Defense Strategy to include military force structure, modernization plans, and infrastructure. In accordance with 10 USC 118, the QDR also informs Congress of the resources necessary to implement our National Defense Strategy with moderate to low risk of failure. As such, the QDR is both a defense strategy and a program for the next twenty year period.

As directed by 10 USC 153, The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) must publish an assessment of the strategic and military risks associated with executing the missions called for under the current National Military Strategy. This report must be published no later than the 1<sup>st</sup> of January of each odd numbered year. The Chairman fulfils this requirement by publishing the National Military Strategy (NMS). The Secretary of Defense is further directed to include the NMS along with his plan to mitigate the risks identified by the CJCS with the following fiscal year's DoD budget submission. Thus the NMS provides the CJCS a powerful feedback mechanism within the budget programming and budget process.

A review of the documents published in the previous decade indicates a dramatic shift in emphasis from the bi-polar cold war threat posed by the Soviet Union to the uncertainty of the post cold war period. The seminal events precipitating the shift in strategic guidance were the terrorist attacks which took place on September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001. Prior to that time, strategic guidance focused on the threat posed by a near peer



competitor. Strategic policy documents since September 11, 2001 have recognized the nation's greatest threat as terrorism carried out by non-state actors and failing or failed nation-states. These more recent documents place an increased emphasis on developing multi-national solutions to the root causes of terrorism (such as oppressive governments and a lack of economic opportunity) and pandemic disease.

Recognizing the need for greater flexibility in a rapidly changing and uncertain global environment, strategic guidance has continually called for military transformation. The focus of proposed transformation is to mitigate the threat of asymmetric warfare typically waged by non-state organizations, failed or failing states and terrorists. Since the capabilities necessary to counter asymmetric threats vary significantly from those needed to defeat a large standing army, one would expect significant programmatic changes within the Army's budget.

To better identify anticipated programmatic changes within the Army budget this paper groups MDEPs into the following capability categories: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); facilities; joint and coalition programs; legacy systems; operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and training; personnel and benefits; reserves; transformation; and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As will be seen, grouping MDEPs by capabilities and not the functional groupings managed by the PEGs reveals a slow evolution, not the rapid transformation called for by the strategic published during the previous decade. Further evidence of this slow evolution can be seen by the relatively minor changes to the percentage dedicated to each category between the start and end of the decade. (See table 1.)



<b>FYDP</b>	<b>Facilities</b>	<b>C4ISR</b>	<b>Trans</b>	<b>Joint &amp; Coalition</b>	<b>WMD</b>	<b>Other</b>	<b>Reserves</b>	<b>Legacy Systems</b>	<b>OPTEMPO &amp; Training</b>	<b>Psnl &amp; Benefits</b>
<b>1999</b>	10.52%	4.47%	4.91%	0.97%	2.57%	8.39%	12.39%	9.44%	11.00%	35.34%
<b>2000</b>	9.58%	5.12%	4.81%	0.78%	2.93%	9.13%	12.05%	9.83%	10.82%	34.95%
<b>2001</b>	11.30%	5.25%	5.00%	0.73%	2.37%	8.70%	12.31%	10.34%	10.86%	33.13%
<b>2002</b>	12.74%	5.48%	6.16%	0.76%	2.44%	8.24%	11.63%	11.09%	10.29%	31.17%
<b>2003</b>	10.93%	5.40%	5.73%	2.23%	2.60%	7.88%	12.60%	10.25%	10.99%	31.41%
<b>2004</b>	10.42%	5.41%	8.03%	2.19%	2.83%	8.27%	12.86%	8.06%	10.51%	31.42%
<b>2005</b>	11.23%	5.17%	9.63%	1.71%	2.25%	7.29%	12.82%	7.22%	10.97%	31.72%
<b>2006</b>	10.93%	6.18%	8.58%	1.33%	1.54%	7.98%	13.68%	7.75%	9.05%	32.99%
<b>2007</b>	12.61%	6.78%	9.64%	1.23%	1.84%	6.89%	12.55%	8.68%	9.65%	30.13%
<b>2008</b>	11.71%	6.32%	8.47%	1.08%	1.79%	7.74%	11.61%	7.73%	9.54%	34.02%
<b>2009</b>	14.57%	6.33%	8.15%	1.07%	2.04%	7.45%	11.20%	8.92%	9.98%	30.29%
<b>2010</b>	12.61%	6.23%	6.34%	1.37%	2.98%	7.39%	11.23%	8.15%	9.65%	34.02%
<b>Delta</b>	<b>2.10%</b>	<b>1.76%</b>	<b>1.43%</b>	<b>0.41%</b>	<b>0.41%</b>	<b>1.00%</b>	<b>-1.16%</b>	<b>-1.29%</b>	<b>-1.34%</b>	<b>-1.32%</b>

Table 1.

To measure programmatic changes the percentage of total funding for all FYDP years allocated to each category is calculated. These percentages are then compared to the subsequent year's FYDP. Any changes in the percentage allocated indicate a programmatic change. Percentage changes are calculated using the sum of all years contained in the FYDP and not individual budget years for two reasons. First, since the 9/11 attacks the size of the defense budget has increased substantially. Thus, simply tracking dollar amounts would not accurately portray a change in the relative importance placed on programs. Second, the FYDP and not individual budget years are used to calculate budget share in order to normalize the data in cases of single year anomalies. (See Appendix for a list of all MDEPs grouped by category.)

Furthermore, when comparing budget submissions only fiscal years common to the two FYDPs are considered. Thus, when comparing FY2000 with FY2001, only the delta between FY2001, FY2002, FY2003, FY2004 and FY 2005 would be calculated.



Similarly when comparing FY2001 and FY2002 only the delta between FY 2002 through 2005 would be used (See Table 2.)

FY 2000 FYDP	FY 2001 FYDP	FY 2002 FYDP
2000		
2001	2001	
2002	2002	2002
2003	2003	2003
2004	2004	2004
2005	2005	2005
		2006
		2007

Table 2.

The first document to be reviewed is the 1999 National Security Strategy signed by President William Clinton in December of that year. This was the last national security document published prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Written nearly 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the document begins to recognize the change from a bi-polar to multi-polar security environment.

With no clear threat from a near peer competitor on the horizon, the 1999 National Security Strategy seems to be written primarily as a justification narrative for the Fiscal Year 2001 budget submission to Congress. The President outlines three core policy objectives within the document. These objectives are: To enhance America's security, to bolster economic prosperity, and to promote democracy and human rights abroad.<sup>3</sup> In order to accomplish these objectives, the President outlines a course of action stressing the need to pursue multinational solutions to emerging challenges, enlarge NATO to help promote stability in Eastern Europe, and increase the emphasis on diplomatic or "soft power" solutions.



The President lists arms control and non-proliferation, forward basing of trained and ready troops, freedom of navigation on the seas, information superiority and recruitment, retention of high quality personnel, and transformation to in order to meet future challenges as key military priorities. The document outlines the affects of the START II treaty on the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. It touts how the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. Lastly, the President directs that the military end the use of all anti-personnel landmines outside of Korea by 2003 and aggressively seek to eliminate their use by 2006. Based on an analysis of these military objectives one would expect an increased emphasis on the following categories within the FY 2000 budget: WMD, facilities, C4ISR, personnel and benefits, joint and coalition programs and transformation.

A review of major programmatic changes between the FY 1999 and FY 2000 budget do not reflect these anticipated programmatic changes. Upon examination, one finds an increased emphasis on C4ISR, facilities, and reserve programs. The funding for these programs came at the expense of legacy systems, OPTEMPO & training, transformation, and WMD. Table 3 lists the total programmatic changes by category between the FY1999 and FY 2000 budget submissions. The decreased emphasis placed on WMD and joint and coalition programs as reflected in the budget FY 2000 FYDP is especially surprising since the 1999 National Security Strategy was written in the style of a cover letter to Congress justifying FY 2000 national security related budgets.



<b>Category</b>	<b>% of FY 99 FYDP</b>	<b>% of FY 00 FYDP</b>	<b>% Change</b>
Facilities	10.4	10.9	0.6
C4ISR	4.5	5.0	0.5
Reserves	11.5	11.9	0.4
Other	8.2	8.6	0.4
Joint & Coalition	0.9	0.8	-0.1
Personnel and Benefits	34.1	34.0	-0.1
WMD	2.7	2.4	-0.3
Transformation	5.5	5.2	-0.3
OPTEMPO & Training	11.0	10.6	-0.4
Legacy Systems	11.2	10.6	-0.7

Table 3 Comparison of FY 99 and FY 00 FYDP

As the first strategic guidance published after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) marks what may be the most significant change in defense policy and priorities during the examined period. The QDR was also the first major defense policy document of the Bush administration. The 2001 QDR directs a shift in defense planning from the “threat based” policies of the cold war period to “capabilities based” planning.

The dominant theme of the 2001 QDR is transformation of the military. The document states the military must transform for two principal reasons; first, to maintain the United States’ military’s capabilities edge and second, to reduce defense spending to manageable levels. Within this overall construct, the QDR provides the following strategic and operational goals. The strategic goal is to transform the military in order to defend the United States; deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions; swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts and to conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations.

The document also established six operational goals.<sup>4</sup>



- 1) Protect critical bases of operations
- 2) Assure information systems in the face of attack and conduct effective information operations
- 3) Project and sustain U.S. forces in distant anti-access or area denial environments.
- 4) Deny enemy sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike munitions against both mobile and stationary targets in all weather conditions.
- 5) Enhance the capability and survivability of space systems and supporting infrastructure.
- 6) Leverage information technology and innovative concepts to develop an interoperable joint C4ISR architecture and capability that includes a tailorable joint operational picture.

In addition to these operational goals the Secretary of the Army is specifically directed to accelerate the introduction of forward-stationed Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT's). The stated purpose of this reorganization was to strengthen deterrence and improve U.S. strategic responsiveness.

Because of the technical enablers necessary to transform a standard brigade into an IBCT and the requirement to develop interoperable C4ISR, one would expect a significant acceleration of transformation related programs and a continued increase in C4ISR. An increased importance on joint and coalition programs could also be expected. A review of the budget submission confirms that the programmatic changes between the FY2001 and FY2002 budget reflect QDR guidance (See Table 4.) The



primary bill payers for the increased emphasis on transformation and C4ISR programs are legacy systems and OPTEMPO & training. These programmatic adjustments made between the FY 01 and FY 02 FYDPs more than reversed the FY 01 downward adjustment of transformation programs at the apparent expense of near term readiness, as measured by the decreased emphasis on OPTEMPO and training and legacy systems. (See Table 4).

<b>Category</b>	<b>% of FY 01 FYDP</b>	<b>% of FY 02 FYDP</b>	<b>% Change</b>
Transformation	5.60	6.48	0.88
C4ISR	5.04	5.38	0.33
Facilities	10.78	10.98	0.19
WMD	2.13	2.23	0.10
Joint & Coalition	0.71	0.77	0.06
Reserves	12.07	12.12	0.06
Personnel and Benefits	33.09	33.11	0.02
Other	8.14	7.94	-0.20
OPTEMPO & Training	10.70	10.15	-0.56
Legacy Systems	11.72	10.84	-0.88

Table 4.

The National Security Strategy published by President Bush in September 2002 was a significant departure from the 1999 National Security Strategy in both form and content. While the National Security Strategy published by President Clinton was clearly written with budget justification in mind, this document is focused on identifying emerging threats and national security policies and objectives in a post 9/11 world.

On the very first page of the National Security Strategy, the President declares that the era of large scale conventional forces meeting on a field of battle to decisively settle national disagreements is over. In the absence of a likely conventional threat, the President defines the most dangerous threats to vital U.S. national interest as failed and



failing states using technology in unconventional ways in order to gain an asymmetric advantage over current U.S. forces. The most notable of his policy priorities were the expansion of democracy, expanding economic freedoms throughout the globe and guarding against the effects of pandemic diseases.

Within the document the President outlines the steps he has taken to improve security including creation of the Department of Homeland Defense and a new Unified Command (NORTHCOM). In order to continue this progress he directs the military to focus on three primary tasks. First, shift the planning focus from preparing to fight conventional wars to what we now refer to as Irregular Warfare. Second, develop capabilities in support of WMD counter proliferation efforts. This task also includes the requirement to support consequence management should a WMD incident actually occur. Lastly, DoD was directed to continue ongoing transformation initiatives with a focus on joint operations, C4ISR capabilities, financial management, and recruiting and retention.

As one might expect, such a departure from the previous National Security Strategy resulted in a high number of budgetary adjustments. In accordance with the President's guidance a large number of legacy systems saw their budgets decreased as a percentage of the Army's TOA. Considering the President's emphasis on the need to recruit and retain high quality personnel, the decline in the percentage of the FYDP allocated to personnel and benefits appears to be in direct contradiction to the guidance contained in the NSS (See Table 5.)



<b>Category</b>	<b>% of FY 03 FYDP</b>	<b>% of FY 04 FYDP</b>	<b>% Change</b>
Transformation	7.11	9.12	2.01
Other	7.19	7.75	0.56
Facilities	10.62	10.97	0.35
C4ISR	4.88	5.21	0.33
Reserves	12.76	12.98	0.21
Joint & Coalition	2.02	2.11	0.09
WMD	2.37	2.45	0.09
OPTEMPO & Training	10.49	10.12	-0.38
Personnel and Benefits	32.91	31.53	-1.38
Legacy Systems	9.64	7.76	-1.88

Table 5.

The 2004 National Military Strategy published in May was an extension of the strategic national security goals outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy. The Chairman outlined three primary military objectives in the document, to protect the United States against external attacks and aggression, prevent conflict and surprise attack and to prevail against adversaries.<sup>5</sup> In order to ensure the military is capable of gaining full spectrum dominance over potential adversaries the Chairman provides eight specific areas of focus for military transformation. These focus areas are strengthening intelligence; protecting critical bases of operation; operating from the commons: space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace; projecting and sustaining US forces in distant anti-access environments, denying enemies sanctuary; conducting network-centric operations; improving proficiency for irregular warfare; and lastly increasing the capabilities of partners – international and domestic.<sup>6</sup> Based on the guidance provided, one would expect programmatic changes in the Army budget to emphasize C4ISR, WMD, facilities, joint and coalition programs, and transformation.



<b>Category</b>	<b>% of FY 04 FYDP</b>	<b>% of FY 05 FYDP</b>	<b>% Change</b>
OPTEMPO & Training	9.99	10.42	0.43
Transformation	10.10	10.41	0.31
Reserves	12.98	13.21	0.22
Personnel and Benefits	31.14	31.29	0.15
C4ISR	5.10	5.15	0.05
WMD	2.21	2.23	0.02
Legacy Systems	7.60	7.48	-0.12
Other	7.59	7.45	-0.15
Joint & Coalition	2.04	1.65	-0.38
Facilities	11.25	10.73	-0.53

Table 6

In accordance with the guidance in the NMS we see a substantial increase in transformation. The portion of the FYDP allocated to C4ISR and WMD remained largely unchanged. Finally there were substantial decreases in Joint and Coalition programs and facilities (See Table 6.) While the decreased percentage of the FYDP dedicated to Joint and Coalition programs decreased, the reduction can be attributed to a reduced emphasis on residual missions in South West Asia and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). This seems appropriate since both of those missions were maturing and required fewer resources as a percentage of TOA. The biggest priority funding mismatch appears to be a decreased emphasis on facilities. In fact, the decrease would have been much greater without a substantial increase in funding for range modernization. The increased percentage of the FYDP allocated to range modernization, and OPTEMPO and training were most likely necessitated by pre-deployment training requirements in support of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In the 2005 National Defense Strategy, the Secretary of Defense identifies four strategic objectives; To secure the United States from direct attack, to secure strategic



access and retain global freedom of action, to strengthen alliances and partnerships and lastly, to establish favorable security conditions.

In order to mitigate risk, the Secretary of Defense introduces the concept of an active, layered approach to the defense of the nation and its interests.<sup>7</sup> As described, an active layered approach to defense focuses heavily on proactively preventing attacks on the U.S. and its vital national interests and deterring our enemies from taking provocative actions. These preventive measures include security cooperation, forward deterrence, humanitarian assistance, peace operations, and non-proliferation initiatives.<sup>8</sup>

Finally, the Secretary of Defense provides four guidelines for implementation of the National Defense Strategy.<sup>9</sup> First - DoD will implement an active, layered defense; second - DoD will continuously transform to meet 21st century challenges and opportunities; third – DoD will be a capabilities based organization. We will focus on how we will be challenged not who will challenge us; Lastly, DoD must effectively manage risk.

Based on this guidance C4ISR saw the greatest year to year increase as a percentage of TOA than any other time during this period (See Table 7.) As expected, transformation also saw its percentage of TOA increase. Lastly, legacy systems also saw an increase. The legacy system funding increase can be largely attributed to additional funding for the Blackhawk helicopter. This increase is not surprising considering the extra ordinary wear and tear on these helicopters during simultaneously operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.



<b>Category</b>	<b>% of FY 05 FYDP</b>	<b>% of FY 06 FYDP</b>	<b>% Change</b>
Transformation	10.58	11.58	1.00
C4ISR	5.15	5.81	0.67
Legacy Systems	7.54	8.14	0.60
Facilities	10.62	10.69	0.07
Other	7.48	7.42	-0.06
OPTEMPO & Training	10.30	10.11	-0.18
Reserves	13.29	13.09	-0.20
Joint & Coalition	1.64	1.16	-0.48
WMD	2.22	1.66	-0.56
Personnel and Benefits	31.19	30.33	-0.86

Table 7.

The 2006 National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) were published nearly simultaneously. Both documents represent a continuation of past policies and focus providing course corrections of the 2001 QDR and 2002 National Security Strategy respectively.

The 2006 National Security Strategy is noteworthy because of the unambiguous language used in the document. The 2006 National Security Strategy defines nine essential tasks that must be accomplished in order to secure U.S. vital national interests.<sup>10</sup> These tasks include: champion aspirations for human dignity; strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; work with others to defuse regional conflicts; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and



opportunities of the 21st century; and engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.

Including an introduction and conclusion the document is divided into nine parts each focusing on an individual task. Within each section the President lists progress made in each area since 2002 and the way ahead. This format greatly simplifies the connection between the ends, ways and means of our National Security Strategy.

In the 2006 QDR, the Secretary of Defense informed the services that the document should not be viewed as a radical departure from past policies and guidance. Instead, the document should be used to validate the conclusions reached in the 2001 QDR, apply lessons learned over the past four years and test assumptions about the world.<sup>11</sup>

Within the document itself, the Secretary of Defense continues the theme of active, layered approach to the defense introduced in the 2005 National Defense Strategy. He further defines the concept by establishing four priority areas of focus, to defeat terrorist networks; to defend the homeland in depth; to shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and to prevent hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring WMD.

To better execute active layered defense, the services are given areas of emphasis for their transformation: Institutional reform and governance, Irregular warfare, building partnership capacity, strategic communications and intelligence.

Lastly, the QDR provided the following specific guidance concerning land forces.<sup>12</sup> First, continue to rebalance capabilities by creating modular brigades. The end state of this effort will be 42 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and 75 support



<b>Category</b>	<b>% of FY 06 FYDP</b>	<b>% of FY 07 FYDP</b>	<b>% Change</b>
Legacy Systems	8.12	9.30	1.18
Facilities	10.66	11.66	1.00
C4ISR	5.66	6.65	0.99
WMD	1.69	1.98	0.29
Other	7.25	7.29	0.05
Personnel and Benefits	29.86	29.86	-0.01
Joint & Coalition	1.10	1.08	-0.02
OPTEMPO & Training	9.96	9.93	-0.02
Reserves	13.06	12.43	-0.63
Transformation	12.64	9.82	-2.83

Table 8

brigades in the active component; 28 BCTs and 78 support brigades in the National Guard; 58 support brigades in the Army Reserve. Second, transform Army units and headquarters to modular designs. Third, incorporate FCS improvements into the modular force through a spiral development effort. Last, expand the Air Force Joint Tactical Air Control program.

From this guidance one would expect an increase in funding for transformation, the Reserves, C4ISR, WMD and Joint and Coalition Programs. Surprisingly this assessment is largely inconsistent with the 2007 Army budget request (See Table 8.)

While the percentage of the FYDP apportioned to C4ISR and WMD programs increased, transformation, reserves, and joint and coalition programs all saw their share of the budget decrease. The principle bill payer for program increases was MDEP ZMOD, the modularity wedge created by program budget decision 753. For those unfamiliar with the term, a “wedge” is simply funding that is set aside in the programming years to resource a capability that has not been fully defined and programmed. Once the capability is clearly defined and the program is fully developed,



adjustments are made decrementing the wedge and funding the approved program. While it is normal to see money flow out of a “budget wedge” as future programs become more fully developed, it is interesting to note that in this case the money set aside in ZMOD seems to have flowed to other programs not directly related to army transformation such as facilities and legacy systems.

The 2008 National Defense Strategy was the final strategic guidance published during the timeframe examined in this paper. This was the last major defense policy document published by the Bush administration. The document does not represent a major shift in policy means or objectives. The Secretary of Defense’s five key objectives are to defend the homeland, win the long war, promote security, deter conflict, and win our nation’s wars.<sup>13</sup> The means and capabilities discussed in the document for achieving these objectives come directly from the 2006 QDR.

The last portion of the document is a discussion of risk management. In this discussion several areas of significance are highlighted. From a budgetary perspective, the most significant are operational, force management and institutional risks. When mitigating operational risks, since the U.S. military currently has a sustainable advantage in conventional capabilities the services are directed to explore areas where we can assume risk in order to resource emerging capabilities. The greatest perceived risk from a force management perspective is the recruitment and retention of high quality military and civilian personnel. From an institutional standpoint, the greatest identified risk is an increasingly complex command structure that may lead to unwanted redundancies or capabilities gaps.



<b>Category</b>	<b>% of FY 09 FYDP</b>	<b>% of FY 10 FYDP</b>	<b>% Change</b>
Personnel and Benefits	32.80	34.93	2.13
WMD	1.79	3.01	1.23
Joint & Coalition	1.06	1.45	0.39
Other	7.00	7.36	0.36
Facilities	11.44	11.64	0.19
C4ISR	6.03	6.01	-0.02
OPTEMPO & Training	10.17	9.96	-0.21
Reserves	12.29	11.47	-0.82
Legacy Systems	8.74	7.71	-1.04
Transformation	8.67	6.47	-2.20

Table 9.

Considering guidance provided in this document, one would expect only small programmatic course corrections such as a slightly increased emphasis on joint programs, transformation, and personnel and benefits. Legacy systems would be the expected bill payer for program increases. This being the case, there appears to be a direct correlation between the 2008 National Defense Strategy and the 2010 budget submission. As can be seen in Table 9, the percentage of TOA apportioned to personnel and benefits, WMD, and coalition and joint programs increased. The largest programmatic increases were to personnel and benefit programs with the greatest increase in pay and allowances for military personnel and enlisted army incentives. The downward programmatic adjustment to transformation is largely attributable to decreases across the FYDP for the armed reconnaissance helicopter, Stryker, and the asymmetric warfare group.

The previous decade was one of the most dynamic in our nation's history. During this timeframe ample strategic guidance was published to direct desired changes. Despite this fact, programmatic changes within the budget have not been as far



reaching as one might expect. Once the obstacles to change facing strategic leaders are considered, the moderate pace of change becomes understandable. Unfortunately, if the U.S. military is to maintain its competitive advantage over our nation's adversaries it must find a way to routinely implement change in order to mitigate rapidly emerging and evolving threats to national security.

The private sector provides a never ending source of once successful businesses and organizations that failed because they could not successfully implement change. One need to look no further than the once dominant U.S. auto industry to see the disastrous consequences of failed change initiatives in today's uncertain global marketplace. The plight of the U.S. auto industry is a cautionary tale that the Department of Defense would do well to heed. Like U.S. auto manufacturers of twenty years ago, the Department of Defense finds itself the acknowledged leader of a capital intensive industry. Unfortunately, just as the auto industry found its competitive advantage quickly eroded by more efficient competitors, the nation finds itself facing adversaries who are constantly looking for innovative and cheaper (aka asymmetric) ways to ways to nullify our military's competitive advantage. If the United States military is to maintain its position of dominance it must become more adept at implementing change.

In his highly regarded book, *Leading Change*, John Kotter provides organizations with an eight stage process for implementing change within an organization. The stages of the process are: Establish a sense of urgency; create a guiding coalition; develop a vision and strategy; communicate the change vision; empower employees for broad-based action; generate short-term wins; consolidate gains and produce more change;



and lastly anchor new approaches in the culture.<sup>14</sup> Fortunately, PPBEP has the potential to execute almost every essential element of this process. The following is an examination of Kotter's process in relation to PPBEP with recommendations on actions that could be taken to make it more effective.

Establish a sense of urgency. In order to establish a sense of urgency, leadership must examine the environment and competitive realities. This will enable leadership to identify potential crises, challenges and opportunities. The National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy and National Defense Strategies all analyze the global environment to identify both current and emerging threats. It is this analysis that provides a sense of urgency for behind change within the military. Thus within the PPBE process, current strategy and planning documents fulfill this function.

Create a guiding coalition. As envisioned, the guiding coalition leading change must function as a team. In addition to providing unity of effort, the team must also be empowered to actually affect change. While not part of PPBEP, the President does establish a guiding coalition when he appoints the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Within the Army this guiding coalition is empowered to implement change since

10 USC 3013 states that the Secretary of the Army has the authority to:

conduct all affairs of the Department of the Army, including the following functions: recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping (including research and development), training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel), maintaining, the construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment, and the construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section.



Unfortunately, while the President and title 10 provide good terms of reference for building a guiding coalition within the executive branch and the military, it does not adequately address governmental inter-agency stakeholders. During the time period reviewed, the Army had overcoming two challenges relating to this stage of the process.

The first impediment to change is the limited tenure of Army senior leadership. The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army have changed numerous times during the past decade. This a direct contributing factor to the Army's inability to successfully implement change. Since October, 1999 seven individuals have held the Secretary of the Army post and three Generals have served as the Army Chief of Staff. A possible course of action for mitigating the effects of senior leader turnover is to appoint the Service Secretaries for set terms of four years. This would provide needed continuity and ensure that Service Secretaries are in place for two complete bi-annual budget cycles. This would allow them to ensure the resources (personnel, equipment, and facilities) have been identified and accurately reflected in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), and the President's budget submission to Congress. Two reasons that set term limits may not have been established for the Secretary of the Army position are that serving at the pleasure of the President imparts a sense of urgency to implement policy decisions. The second reason is that under current protocol newly elected Presidents are free to appoint individuals who share their administration's national security vision into this critical position.

Despite the authority granted the Service Secretaries by Title 10, their ability to implement change is limited by Congress. All programs contained within the Army's budget submission must be authorized and appropriated by Congress. As the



Commander in Chief, the President and all members of the administration must work with closely with the congress in order ensure authorizations and appropriations address the most likely threats to national security and administrations highest priorities for mitigating those threats. In addition to efforts by the President, The Department of Defense must take every available opportunity to educate the members of Congress on high priority programs, the fact remains that members of congress do not always share the views of the President and DoD leadership. Since it is prohibited for the Army to directly petition Congress, leadership must continue to take every available opportunity to communicate its vision to Congress.

The third step in Kotter's model is to develop a vision and strategy for implementing change. The United States Army War College defines strategy as a plan that addresses the ends ways and means to achieve an objective. If we are to accept this definition, of the documents reviewed, only the 1999 National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review can be considered true strategy documents. While the NSS, NDS, and NMS adequately identify America's vital interests, threats, goals and objectives they rarely discuss the desired ways or means for achieving goals and objectives or protecting vital national interests. This failure to adequately address the President's desired ways and necessary means for achieving strategic goals adds unnecessary ambiguity to not only the PPBE but also the larger issue of inter-agency capabilities and resource integration.

In addition to the strategic ambiguity caused by a failure to adequately adjust the ways and means for achieving national objectives, within the Army turnover of senior leadership referenced above has impacted the continuity of the Army's vision and



strategy for change. This fact is illustrated by the changes implemented by successive Army Chiefs of Staff concerning the Future Combat System (FCS).

Although General Schoomaker shared General Shinseki's overall vision for Army transformation, he restructured the FCS program implementing a spiral development strategy in hopes of getting new technology into the hands of war fighters at the earliest possible opportunity. He additionally changed the fielding plan and unit of employment from the modular brigade combat teams envisioned by General Shinseki to the Unit of Action. After General Schoomaker was replaced by General George W. Casey, the program was again re-evaluated. When the Secretary of Defense determined that the FCS ground vehicle did not adequately address current threats (the FCS vehicle had a flat hull and not a V-shaped hull which has been proven effective in mitigating the threat of improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan) and that Army leadership had not developed a viable alternative to the proposed designs, development of both the manned ground vehicle and non-line of sight gun systems were halted.<sup>15</sup> Cancellation of these programs effectively marked the end of the originally envisioned FCS. Given the short tenure of these strategic leaders, development of a coherent long term strategic vision is a nearly insurmountable task. With these facts in mind, failure to develop the FCS as initially envisioned can hardly be viewed with surprise.

While The Army Plan certainly provides programmers and budgeters in the Pentagon with direction, it does little to communicate Army vision to portions of the organization located outside of the Pentagon. The Army Chief of Staff currently gives several key note speeches every year, such as his annual address to the AUSA conference, which mitigate this problem. In addition to these speeches, the Chief of



Staff holds periodic “4-Star” conferences to communicate his vision. The fact remains; however, beyond the walls of the Pentagon or below the ranks of General Officers the Army is not effective at communicating its strategic vision for change. Army senior leadership has several ways that this situation can be corrected. First, an unclassified version of the Army Plan could be published with a target audience of ranks between Colonel and Staff Sergeant. Second, Army leadership must continue their strategic communications efforts using the internet and social networks such as Army Knowledge Online, Facebook and Twitter which younger members of the organization are more likely to utilize than printed media. Lastly, throughout their careers both officers and non-commissioned officers attend a number of formal professional development courses. The Secretary of the Army could direct TRADOC to develop and deliver rank appropriate blocks of instruction on current transformation initiatives, and strategies for implementing those changes.

Lastly, when communicating the Army’s vision for change leaders must target external stakeholders. In addition to over 1.3 million internal stakeholders, the Army has numerous external stakeholders that must be considered when initiating change. These external stakeholders include defense contractors (57 of which have annual contracts valued at \$500 million or more)<sup>16</sup>, State Governors, 435 Congressmen and Congresswomen, and 100 Senators. When contemplating change, Army Leaders must consider these powerful external stakeholders and tailor their messages appropriately.

Empower broad-based action. Empowering broad based action entails senior leaders removing obstacles and changing systems or structures that undermine the change vision. It further encourages risk taking and non-traditional ideas, activities and



actions. For the Army to be successful in this stage of the process it must overcome several significant challenges.

Since its inception the Army has been a hierarchical organization. Thus rapidly changing organizational structures has proven to be difficult. The most recent example of this difficulty is the Army's transition to the modular brigade. Enabled by the exploitation of emerging technologies, the modular brigade force structure is the result of the Army's transformation efforts over the past decade. As directed in the 2001 QDR, the Army's plan was to reorganize and train 42 active duty and 28 additional National Guard modular combat brigades by the end of 2011. This effort represents the most significant restructuring of the Army since the end of the cold war. Recognizing the massive commitment of resources necessary to complete the restructuring, under Section 353 of Public Law No. 109-163, Congress directed that the Army develop a detailed comprehensive plan detailing their efforts. Unfortunately, when developing the Army's Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) a basic planning assumption used was that no more than one third of all brigades would be deployed in support of combat operations at any one time. In reality, nearly one half of all units have been deployed at any one time in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This failure to accurately forecast operational requirements has placed the Army in a situation where they are in danger of missing projected restructuring milestones. For this reason, Congress has begun carefully monitoring their progress and may need to direct the reallocation of resources in order to ensure the establishment of required military capabilities.<sup>17</sup>



While it is too early to determine if institutional inertia will result in an unwanted reallocation of resources directed by Congress, implementation of the modular brigades does demonstrate the difficulties of organizational change.

A strong organizational culture rooted in over 200 years of proud Army history is the next factor that must be considered when attempting to empower broad-based action for change. As of Fiscal Year 2009, the United States Army is an organization of approximately 1.3 million members. Each of these soldiers and civilians has been indoctrinated to some extent in the Army culture. Since most soldiers see their chosen vocation as a calling and a duty to the nation, the Army's culture is exceptionally strong when compared to a civilian institution. While the Army's strong culture can be a tremendous asset as a moral compass during times of war or uncertainty, it can also be a strong impediment to change.

Kotter's next step in for managing change is to create visible improvements in performance or "wins". Planning is the key factor in this stage. While the Army has done this well in the past, such as establishing the 4th ID as the "Digital Division", it has also done this poorly with disastrous consequences. The most recent example of a poorly planned high visibility short-term win was changing the soldier's headgear to the black beret. Recognizing that the Army's heavily armored force structure could not be rapidly deployed in response to post cold war threats; General Shinseki fielded the black beret as a symbol of the expeditionary mindset he wished to instill within the "Objective Force."<sup>18</sup> In doing so, he failed to recognize the impact this would have on three significant subcultures within the organization. While it was clearly General Shinseki's intent to encourage emulation of the Airborne, Ranger, and Special Forces



expeditionary mindset, his actions were perceived as assaults on the most visible manifestations of these elite units; their distinctive headgear.<sup>19</sup>

Because he failed to identify how fielding the beret would be perceived as an assault on the history and culture of elite units, the Chief of Staff was forced to spend energy and political capital to appease angry veterans and answer the concerns of soldiers serving within the Airborne, Ranger and Special Forces Communities.

Establishing a visible symbol of Army transformation was a valid goal. Had the organizational culture of the Rangers been more carefully considered prior to announcing the uniform change, a less controversial symbol of Army transformation may have been chosen. Thus the time and energy consumed to symbolize change could have been spent on more substantial transformation efforts.

Consolidate gains and produce more change. Within the PPBEP process the most effective tool available to senior leadership are the POM and FYDP. Once programs are established or targeted for change the resources necessary for implementation are recorded in the POM and FYDP. During the budget justification process, review of the POM and FYDP effectively notify all internal stakeholders of past and future change initiatives.

The last step in Kotter's process is to anchor change in the organization's culture. The primary tools for anchoring new approaches in the Army's culture are leader development, doctrine and the force development process. It is vital Army Leadership recognize the importance of TRADOC to the long term success of the Army. As the principle agent for training, concepts, material, doctrine and force development, TRADOC is a key enabler to successful Army transformation. The temptation to divert



resources from TRADOC to the operational force must be resisted if the Army is to remain relevant in the future.

Change within a massive organization such as the United States Army is extremely difficult. The past decade has been an era of historic change. Spanning from a post cold war period when the United States found itself without a near peer competitor for the first time, through the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> and the emergence of failed states and non-state actors as the greatest threats to U.S. national interests. A common theme of the strategic guidance published during the last 10 years is the necessity for military transformation.

The President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff routinely publish strategic guidance in an attempt to foster the changes necessary to defeat our adversaries and mitigate future threats. Although the Army has dedicated enormous resources to implementation of this guidance, organizational changes and capabilities development (as measured by programmatic changes within budget submissions) is often slower and less far reaching than required.

Fortunately, change is possible. The PPBEP process is an empirical system that seeks to apportion resources in accordance with vital U.S. national interests. As currently implemented the PPBE process performs many of the functions identified by John Kotter as necessary for successfully implementing change. During the planning process the President, Secretary of Defense and Chairman must place more emphasis on addressing ways and means in strategy documents. Leadership should also use all means available to ensure all members of the military are aware of transformation efforts. The high turnover rate of senior leadership within the services must also be



addressed to ensure irreversible momentum for change initiatives is achieved. During the integrated programming and budgeting phase all strategic leaders must work closely with Congress to ensure that required capabilities are resourced adequately. By recognizing PPBE as an agent of change and not a resourcing tool, strategic leaders' efforts to transform the military will become both more effective and efficient.



## APPENDIX

### ARMY MDEP GROUPINGS (1999-2009) BY CAPABILITIES.

#### **C4ISR**

AMCE - Depot Maintenance Communications-Electronic End Items  
ATCN - IEW System Management  
FADI - Army Spectrum Management  
FAFM - Army Knowledge Management  
FL6P - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)  
FPDA - SHORTSTOP  
FPDB - Aerial Common Sensor (ACS)  
FPDD - Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT)  
FPDE - Night Vision  
FPDH - Target Acquisition Sensors  
FPDK - Signal Warfare  
FPDL - Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Ground Collection  
FPDM - Advanced QUICKFIX  
FPDP - Distributed Common Ground System, Army (DCGS-A)  
FPDQ - Combat ID  
FPED - ASE--ACFT Surveillance Equipment  
FPFE - CI/HUMINT Sensors, Sources & Processors  
FPFF - ISR UAV Sensors  
FPFJ - Army Battle Command System Integration  
FPFL - Fire Support C2 Systems  
FPFP - MCS -- Maneuver Control System  
FPFR - GCCS-A -- Global Command & Control System -Army  
FPFS - Engineer C2 Systems  
FPFV - Knowledge Visualization Sys (KVS)  
FPMA - NAVSTAR GPS  
FPMB - TTACS (MSE)  
FPMC - Tactical Network Communications  
FPMD - Automatic Distribution of Data Between Battlefield Command and Control Systems  
FPMH - Defense SATCOM Systems  
FPMJ - MILSATCOM  
FPMK - MILSTAR  
FPMM - Tactical Radios  
FPSC - F XX1 Battle Command Bde & Below (FBCB2)  
FPTA - Horizontal Battlefield Digitization  
GP3I - NFIP/S&IA  
GPCI - Army Counter-Intelligence  
GPIR - Intelligence Readiness  
GPIS - Intelligence Support to Operations  
GPRC - Defense Intel Reserve Program  
MPBO - Unit Level Biometric Programs



MPE0 - CSS SATCOM Sustainment  
MR1B - SOUTHCOM C3 Upgrade  
MR1F - EMC Equipment  
MR1K - WWTCIP  
MS1Z - CS/CSS Systems Other  
MS2B - LCSS Hardware Support  
MS2D - HQDA ADP  
MS2Z - Army Information Systems Selection and Acquisition Agency  
MS4B - High Performance Computer  
MS4X - Information Assurance (IA)  
MS4Z - MACOM Mission ADP Sustainment  
MS5N - CID Command Information System  
MS5P - MP Management Information System  
MS5Z - HRC Core Automation Support  
MS6B - Reserve Component Automation System  
MSEC - Army Biometrics Program  
MU1K - TROJAN Communications  
MU1V - Pentagon Telecommunications Center  
MU1W - Defense Message System-Army  
MU1X - Information Management Test, Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment  
MU2B - HQDA Command & Control (Enhanced)  
MU2M - Small Computer Program  
MU2P - MEPCOM JCC & IRR  
MU2Z - Installation Info Infrastructure Mod Program (I3MP)  
MUIK - Artificial Intelligence Center  
MX25 - Information Systems Support To INSCOM  
MX5T - Information Systems Security  
MXA3 - Information Systems Support To ASC  
MXCC - Information Systems Support to SWA  
MXCL - Long Haul Communications  
MXDA - Information Systems Support to HQDA  
MXEC - Technical Support of Info Sys Engineering Missions  
MXEU - Information Systems Support to Europe  
MXHS - Information Systems Support to HSC  
MXKA - OCONUS Communication Infrastructure  
MXMD - Information Systems Support to MDW  
MXMT - Information Systems Support to MTMC  
MXSC - Information Systems Support to SOUTHCOM  
MXSH - Strategic C-2 Facilities  
MXTR - Information Systems Support to TRADOC  
MXUS - Army Wide Information Systems Support MACOMS  
MXWE - Information Systems Support to USARPAC  
NG7S - MSCA Non Standard Communications & Equip  
RH01 - Tactical Intelligence and Exploitation  
RH02 - Tactical Intelligence Support  
RH10 - REDTRAIN



RH12 - TROJAN  
RH22 - Digital Imagery Transmission Systems  
RJ50 - Medium Truck Service Life Extension Program  
RK10 - Unmanned Systems Technology  
RK15 - ISR Technology  
RK19 - C4 Technology  
SPFE - ASAS Sustain  
V20H - PACIFIC AREA INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM (PARIS)  
VISA - INTEL Support To Acquisitions  
VLWA - Information Operations  
WDAC - 1st Information Operations Command  
WNET - NETCOM Network Operations and Security Centers  
WSUS - MTOE Unit Equipment Support  
X9IN - Intelligence Center  
XMGS - Pentagon IT Infrastructure  
XTIS - TDA Intelligence Support

### **Facilities**

BR2A - BRAC Program Management  
BR3A - BRAC 93 COSTS  
BR5A - Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 95 Costs  
BRAC - Base Realignment and Closure  
DA3G - Leadership Initiatives  
DMCS - Mobilization Construction Support  
DSWF - Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-5)  
E301 - Revitalization of Operations & Training Facilities  
E302 - Revitalization of Maintenance & Production Facilities  
E303 - Revitalization of RDTE Facilities  
E304 - Revitalization of Supply & Storage Facilities  
E306 - Revitalization of Administrative Facilities  
E308 - Revitalization of Utilities, Roads and Grounds  
E314 - MCA Planning and Design  
E315 - Minor Construction Program  
E318 - MCA Currency Fluctuations  
E325 - Homeowners Assistance Program  
E32H - Army Family Housing: Operations and Maintenance, Leasing  
E32L - AFH Leasing  
E32R - Revitalization of Army Family Housing  
E33H - Army Family Housing: O & M, Leasing US Overseas  
E33R - Revitalization of Army Family Housing Us Overseas  
E34H - Army Family Housing: Operations and Maintenance, Leasing Foreign  
E34R - Revitalization of Army Family Housing Foreign  
E35H - Army Family Housing: Operations and Maintenance, Leasing-CONUS  
E35R - CONUS Revitalization of Army Family Housing  
E3C7 - Revitalization of Community/QOL Facilities  
E3H6 - Unaccompanied Personnel Housing



E3H7 - Permanent Party Barracks Modernization Program  
E3H8 - Basic Training Complex  
E3H9 - Operational Readiness Training Complex  
E3RE - USACE In Support To Army  
EAFS - Focused Facility Strategy Investment Program  
EAMF - Facility requirements in support of AMF  
EGRO - Grow the Army - Military Construction  
ERCI - Residential Communities Initiative (RCI)  
ERVT - Military Construction  
EXCS - Excess Industrial Facility Disposal  
FALO - ODCS G-4 Field Support  
HPIP - Historic Properties Improvement Program  
MPT4 - Sustaining Base Information Services  
MS3J - Strategic Deployment Automation  
MS8Z - Engineer Automation Support  
MU1U - MCA Information Management Install  
MXCB - Base Communications  
MXET - IMA Support  
QAAF - Army Airfields (AAF) and Heliports (AHP)  
QDEM - Facility Reduction Program  
QDPW - Public Works & Municipal Activities  
QMIS - Army Installation Support  
QNMG - Installation Command & Management  
QOIM - Base Information Management Operations  
QPNT - Pentagon Reservation Facility  
QRBA - RDTE LABS BASOPS(-)  
QRBT - RDTE TEST Ranges BASOPS(-)  
QRPA - Real Property Maintenance  
QRRR - O&M for All Army RDTE Funded Labs and Installations  
QRRT - RPMA RDTE Test Ranges  
QUTM - Army Energy & Utility Program  
RE04 - Ammunition Production Base SMCA  
RN06 - OPA 2 Production Base  
RN08 - Production Base/Base-Level Commercial Equipment  
RN09 - Production Base Support  
RN10 - Production Base Support (PBS) Requirements for Weapons Combat Vehicles  
TAVI - Visual Information Training Support Centers  
TCJT - Joint Readiness Training Center  
TCNT - CTC Modernization  
TCRT - NSTD Ranges & Target  
TCSC - Battle Simulation Centers  
TCWA - Deep Attack Center of Excellence  
TCWP - Warrior Prep Center  
TDDU - National Defense University  
TSAM - STRICOM Headquarters  
TSMA - U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy



USMA - United States Military Academy  
USMB - United States Military Academy Preparatory School  
USMC - ACAD Modernization  
VARY - Rand Arroyo Center  
VAWD - CSA Incentive Awards  
VEMR - Environmental Support to Ranges & Munitions  
VENC - Environmental Compliance  
VENN - Environmental Conservation  
VENQ - Environmental Quality  
VEPP - Environmental Pollution Prevention  
VEQT - Environmental Quality Technology  
VEUR - Europe Retrograde  
VIPP - Installation Preparedness Program  
VJAL - Confinement Facilities  
VMUS - Army's Museum Program  
VSCW - Training Range Operations  
VSRM - Sustainable Range Modernization  
VTBL - Battle Labs

**Joint & Coalition Programs**

JDHB - Developing Country's Combined Exercise Program  
JDHC - Humanitarian Civic Assistance  
JDJT - Joint/Defense Activities  
JDSP - Joint DoD Support  
JSTF - Joint Standing Task Force  
MPTZ - CALS Test Center  
MS4F - EUCOM Command CTRS  
MU2E - Joint Visual Information Services  
TSSO - SOUTHCOM, USARSO, JTF-B  
VCAT - Civic Action Teams  
VCST - Civil Support Teams  
VDRG - AIR RECON LOW (ARL)  
VEXA - Army Executive Agency Appns  
VFMS - Technology Export Control  
VFRE - Operation Enduring Freedom  
VFRP - Global War on Terrorism/Guantanamo Bay Opns  
VHAI - Haitian Refugee  
VIAD - Homeland Integrated Air Defense System  
VIRQ - Military Actions Against IRAQ  
VJCS - CJCS Exercises  
VKCD - Korean Combined Defense Improvement Projects  
VMNF - Multinational Force  
VNEA - Northeast Asia Contingency Operations  
VOTS - OEF-TS  
VRFM - Residual Force Missions (SWA)  
VRSC - Regional Security Centers



VRSI - Standardization and Interoperability Programs  
VSCC - Worldwide Contingencies  
VSEU - Europe Stovepipe  
VTFE - Joint Task Force - East (JTF-E)  
VTPA - Panama Canal Treaty (Army)  
VYUG - Ops in FYROM  
W5ND - NATO FC ADA  
W5NF - NATO FC FA  
W5NH - NATO FC AVN  
W5NM - NATO FC MED  
W5NO - NATO FC Ordnance  
W5NP - NATO FC MP  
W5NQ - NATO FC QM  
W5NT - NATO FC Transportation  
W5NU - NATO FC MI  
W5NY - NATO FC Chemical  
WPPM - Panama Defense  
XISH - NATO  
XISQ - International Support, Other  
XMGN - Army Support to International Military HQS  
XXSW - Support to Non-DoD Agency

### **Legacy Systems**

ALTF - Lead the Fleet  
AMAE - Depot Maintenance Aircraft End Items  
AMAS - Fixed Wing Life Cycle Contract Support  
AMLC - Depot Maintenance Life Cycle Software Support  
AMME - Depot Maintenance Missile End Items  
AMSA - Sustainment Systems Technical Support (SSTS)  
AMTE - Depot Maintenance Other End Items  
AMTV - Army Tact Wheel Vehicle Other Maintenance  
AMWE - Depot Maintenance Combat Vehicles END ITEMS  
FL6Q - M9-ACE -- M9 Armored Combat Earthmover  
FL6Y - Fire Support Vehicle (FSV)  
FPDT - Second Generation FLIR/OWN Night  
FPEA - Apache Attack Helicopter  
FPEF - Kiowa Warrior  
FPEG - Blackhawk  
FPEH - CH-47  
FPEL - Longbow Apache  
FPEN - AH-1 (COBRA)  
FPEP - Avionics  
FPHB - Self-Propelled Howitzers  
FPHC - Cannon Artillery Ammo  
FPHG - Crusader  
FPHH - Crusader-RSV



FPJA - Heavy Tactical Vehicle Systems  
 FPJB - Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) Systems  
 FPJC - Medium Tactical Vehicle (MTV) Systems  
 FPLB - Javelin  
 FPLC - Fire Support Missiles  
 FPLE - Aviation Rockets and Missiles  
 FPLF - Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)  
 FPLP - Stinger  
 FPLR - Avenger  
 FPQC - Patriot (ATM)  
 FPSA - Abrams  
 FPSB - Bradley Fighting Vehicle System (BFVS)  
 MT5Y - Tactical CE Equipment Redistribution  
 QBND - US Army Bands  
 RA09 - M113, Selected Procurement & Modifications  
 RA13 - SEL PROC, WTCV  
 RA14 - Mortar Systems  
 RB03 - Towed Howitzer  
 RB12 - Artillery Accuracy Equipment  
 RD07 - OH-58 Modifications  
 RD12 - Aircraft Component Improvement Program  
 RD13 - Utility Fixed Wing Aircraft  
 RD15 - Aviation Ground Support Equipment  
 RD17 - ACFT component improvement  
 RF08 - Armored Engineer Vehicles  
 RJC0 - Maintenance & EOD Equipment  
 RJC5 - Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Equipment  
 RR01 - Abrams M1A1 AIM XXI Rebuild Recapitalization  
 RR02 - Apache AH-64A Rebuild Recapitalization  
 RR03 - Blackhawk UH-60A Rebuild Recapitalization  
 RR04 - Chinook CH-47D Rebuild Recapitalization  
 RR05 - Recovery Vehicle M88A1 Rebuild Recapitalization  
 RR07 - Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE) M9 Rebuild Recapitalization  
 RR08 - M2 Bradley Recapitalization OMA Support  
 RR09 - MLRS Recapitalization OMA Support  
 RR10 - Patriot Rebuild Recapitalization  
 RR12 - HEMTT Rebuild Recapitalization  
 RR13 - Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE) Rebuild Recapitalization  
 RR15 - Firefinder Rebuild Recapitalization  
 RR16 - Electronic Shop Shelter Rebuild Recapitalization  
 RR17 - FAASV M992 Rebuild Recapitalization  
 RR18 - Bulldozer D7 Rebuild Recapitalization  
 RR21 - HMMWV Recapitalization Rebuild  
 RU01 - Abrams Upgrade Recapitalization  
 RU02 - Apache AH-64D Upgrade Recapitalization  
 RU03 - Blackhawk UH-60M Upgrade Recapitalization



RU04 - CH-47F Upgrade Recapitalization  
RU05 - Hercules M88A2 Upgrade Recapitalization  
RU06 - AVLB Upgrade Recapitalization  
RU08 - Bradley Upgrade Recapitalization  
RU09 - MLRS M270A1 Upgrade Recapitalization  
RU10 - Patriot Upgrade Recapitalization  
RU11 - Armored FOV M113A3 Upgrade Recapitalization  
RU12 - HEMTT ESP Upgrade Recapitalization  
RU14 - Glider (Line Haul) M915A4 Upgrade Recap  
SAAA - SSTS Artillery, Ground Armament Sub-Sys, Small Arms  
SAVN - SSTS Avn, Avionics, Air Armament Sub-Systems, Ai  
SCCC - SSTS Command, Cntrl, Comm-El, Computer, Mobile Power  
SLTT - Other Sustainment  
SMSL - SSTS Missiles  
SOTH - SSTS Other Tech Support Programs  
SPEA - Sustain PM Apache  
SPEF - Sustain PM Kiowa Warrior  
SPEG - Sustain PM Blackhawk  
SPEH - Sustain PM CH-47D  
SPEJ - Sustain PM SOA  
SPEL - Sustain Longbow Apache  
SPEN - PM AH-1 (COBRA)  
SPHB - Sustains Howitzer Improvement Program Systems  
SPLC - Sustain PM ATACMS  
SPLF - MLRS Sustainment  
SPLK - TOW Sustainment  
SPNC - Sustain PM Patriot  
SPNF - PM PMS Sustainment  
SPSA - Abrams Sustainment  
SPSB - BFVS Sustainment  
SPSD - Sustain PM LOSAT  
XMCA - MCA Support of Equipment Modifications

### **OPTEMPO & Training**

A2AM - Second Destination Transportation Training Ammunition  
FAAC - Accessions Command Support  
FAJC - JAG Corps Leader Development  
FAJM - JAG Corps MOS Qualification  
FAJS - Continuing Legal Education and JAG School Activities  
FAME - USMEPCOM  
FARC - Army Recruiting  
FAWC - U.S. Army War College  
HSDP - USAR Medical Regional Training Sites  
MS4D - Army Model Improvement and Simulation Technology  
MS4J - TRADOC Analysis Command Computer  
MS5H - Army Training Requirements and Resources System



MS5L - USMA Automation  
MSBZ - TRADOC School ADP  
QNCO - NCO Academies  
QPTO - Planning, Training, and Mobilization Operations  
RE01 - Training Ammunition  
RE06 - War and Operations Ammunition  
RJM5 - Army Watercraft  
RK14 - Advanced Simulation  
RP04 - Regional Maintenance Training Sites  
TACE - Army Civilian Education & Training  
TACV - Army Civilian Intern Program  
TADT - The Army Distance Learning Program  
TADV - Training Development  
TAEV - Training Evaluation  
TAFM - Army Force Management Training  
TAGP - Graduate Pilot Training  
TAIG - Inspector General Training  
TALP - Army Language Program  
TAMA - Training Accessions  
TAMC - Marshall Center  
TANC - Military Training for TDA Organizations  
TAOC - Officer Candidate School (OCS)  
TAOR - Training Op Research/Analysis  
TAPE - Professional Education  
TATC - Army Training Center Operations  
TATM - Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM)  
TAVN - Undergraduate Flight Training  
TAFE - Training for Army War fighter Experiments  
TBAS - Maneuver/Close Combat Non-system (TADSS)  
TBFS - Fire Support Training Simulations  
TBIS - Advanced Simulation Technologies  
TBMS - Intelligence Training Simulations  
TBWG - Command & Control War-game Simulations (WARSIM)  
TCAT - Combined Arms Tactical Trainers (CATT)  
TCBC - Battle Command Training Program  
TCCM - Combat Maneuver Training Center  
TCIV - Civilian Training  
TDLI - Defense Foreign Language Training  
TDLP - Defense Language Programs  
TFAO - Strategic Leadership Training  
TFNC - Special Skills Training  
TLAM - Louisiana Maneuvers  
TLVN - Command and General Staff College  
TNAC - Overseas Deployment Training  
TNEX - IDT Travel  
TNMG - Total Army School system (TASS)



TNTE - Training Management  
TOAC - Officers Advanced Course Training  
TRPC - Special Branch Scholarship  
TRPD - RC Professional Development Training  
TRRS - SR ROTC Scholarships  
TSGT - NCO Professional Development  
TSPU - Training Support to Units  
TTDY - Military Training Specific Allotment  
TWOC - Warrant Officer Course  
TWOJ - Warrant Officer Candidate Course  
TWOS - Senior Warrant Officer Training  
VACE - Army Continuing Education System (ACES)  
VAQN - Acquisition Corps Education  
VATA - Army Tuition Assistance  
VFHP - Flying Hour Program  
VLDR - Leader Development & Training Ammo Management  
VMSO - Army Models and Simulation  
VOPR - Land Forces Readiness  
VSTD - HQDA Studies Program  
W054 - 54TH Signal Bde  
W106 - 106TH Signal Bde  
W1AD - 1st Armor Division  
W1ID - 1st Infantry Division  
W24D - 24th Infantry Division (Mech) Integrated DIV HQ  
W25D - 25th Infantry Division  
W2ID - 2d Infantry Division  
W2OG - 3rd Infantry Regiment  
W3ID - 3d Infantry Division  
W411 - 11 Signal Brigade  
W42B - 2 Signal Brigade  
W45A - ATC EUROPE  
W45C - 5 SIG/Support Element  
W47B - 7 Signal Brigade  
W4KS - 1 Signal Brigade  
W4KT - NON-DCS Korea  
W501 - 101 Infantry Division  
W504 - 504TH Signal Brigade  
W510 - 10 Infantry Division Mountain  
W516 - 516TH Signal Brigade  
W51C - 1 Cavalry Division  
W52C - 2d Cavalry Division (91 Replace)  
W53A - 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment  
W54M - 4 Infantry Division  
W57B - 177 Armored Brigade  
W582 - 82d Airborne Division  
W5CE - FC Engineer Other



W5CG - FC AG FI LG Other  
W5CS - FC S&M Other  
W5HQ - FORSCOM HQ  
W5NC - FC TAC SIG Support-Europe  
W5SJ - SWA FC JA PA MH  
W5SU - SWA FC MI  
W6BD - 296 Army Band Japan  
W6HQ - HHC Corps Japan  
W76I - 1 BDE 6 INF DIV (L)  
W7AK - Echelon Above BDE-AL  
W7HQ - 45 Support Group & USARPAC  
W7ID - 7th Infantry Division (Light) Integrated Division HQs  
W817 - 17 AVN GP Korea  
W818 - 18 MED Command Korea  
W819 - 19 Support Command Korea  
W8FC - Theater Finance  
W8HQ - EUSA HQ  
W8MP - 8 MP Brigade  
W8PC - 8 Personnel Command  
W8ST - EUSA Support Troop  
W900 - MTOE AVN MAINT CONTR  
W910 - USAREUR HQ  
W91F - USAREUR HQ Support  
W920 - 21 SUPCOM  
W92D - 60 ORD Group  
W92G - 29 ASG  
W930 - SETAF  
W950 - 5 CORPS HQ  
W951 - 3 Support Command  
W956 - 18TH MP BDE  
W957 - 12 AVN GP  
W95A - 5TH Corps Artillery  
W95E - 130 ENGR GP  
W95S - 22 SIG BDE  
W95Z - 205 CEWI GP  
W960 - 32 AADCOM  
W980 - 7 MEDCOM  
W98D - 7 MEDCOM (DENTAL)  
W9B0 - 1 PERSCOM  
W9N0 - 7 ATC  
WA00 - 500 MI BDE  
WA01 - 501 MI BDE  
WA13 - 513 MI BDE  
WA66 - 66 MI BDE  
WA70 - 470 MI BDE  
WASC - 9th Army Signal Command



WCCM - Combat Maneuver Training Center (OPTEMPO)  
WCJT - Joint Readiness Training Center (OPTEMPO)  
WCLS - TADSS Contractor Logistics Support (CLS)  
WCNT - National Training Center (OPTEMPO)  
WCTC - CTC Support Activities  
WEAD - Non-Divisional MTO&E Units  
WGMD - Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)  
WMDE - MDW Engineer CO  
WSFA - Special Operations Forces (Active Component)  
X4SA - Army Acquisition Executive Support  
XCID - Criminal Investigation Division Activities  
XFMU - Army Marksmanship Unit  
XLSA - Supply Activity  
XMGF - Army Management Headquarters Activities In FOAS  
XMGH - Major Management Headquarters Activities  
XMGI - Major Management Headquarters Activities-IM  
XMPE - AMHA PEO Activities  
XTEQ - Tactical Equipment Maintenance  
ZAMH - TDA Restructure  
ZDFM - Direct-Funded Ssf Maintenance and Supply  
ZKEM - Hold MDEP  
ZMFM - Reimbursable GS Component Repair

**Other**

A2AA - Second Destination Transportation AAFES  
A2AP - Second Destination Transportation APO Mail  
A2CA - Second Destination Transportation Contingency ACNT  
A2DD - Second Destination Transportation Dodds  
A2DR - Second Destination Transportation for Directed Material Movement & Redistribution  
A2WA - Second Destination Transportation War reserves AMMO Allies  
A2WN - Second Destination Transportation War Reserves (NON-AMMO)  
A2WR - Second Destination Transportation War Reserves (Ammunition)  
AACS - Conventional Ammunition (SMCA)  
AANS - Conventional Ammunition (NON-SMCA)  
ADSM - DBOF Supply OPS IMM  
AIEI - National Inventory Control Point (NICP) Operations  
ALSA - SA-CONT LG SUPPORT-NMRIS  
ASAS - Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Program Management  
ASCE - USAMC End Item Procurement Operations  
ASDE - Conventional Ammunition Demilitarization  
ASEI - End Item Supply Depot Operations  
ASFM - Non-Army Source of Supply Asset Management  
ASIE - Industrial Preparedness Operations  
ASIP - Industrial Mobilization Capacity (IMC)  
ASLS - Logistics Assistance / Oil Analysis Programs



ASLT - Logistics Support Programs  
ASOC - OCIE Sustainment  
ASPO - Transportation Operations  
ASTC - Chemical Weapons Stockpile and Materiel Storage  
DMRA - Mobilization Rail Access  
E3RC - TRAMO  
EIGP - IGPBS  
EMAP - Terrain and Topographic Support  
ENVR - Environmental Restoration Program  
FAAA - USA Audit Agency  
FACB - Office Chief of Chaplains (OCCH)  
FACE - COST & Economic Analysis Center  
FACS - Army Safety Center  
FAFC - Purchase of Finance and Accounting Services  
FAIG - Inspector General Agency  
FAJA - JAG ORGS/Claims  
FAOD - Center of Military History  
FAPA - ODCSPER Mission Support  
FAPM - HR Command (HRC)  
FARD - Contract Support Agency  
FASS - Secretary of the Army Field Operating Activities  
FL8R - Army Diagnostics Improvement Program (ADIP)  
FPSF - CMS (CMV)  
FPSN - Mines and Munitions  
GPSI - Personnel Security Investigations  
HSUK - Medical Potency & Dated Supply Readiness  
JDFM - FMS Manpower Support  
MPEH - STAMIS and LOG AUTO Systems Sustainment  
MPEI - SALE Sustainment  
MPT0 - Logistics Network  
MPT1 - Automated Identification Technology (AIT)  
MPT2 - Army Food Management Info System  
MPT3 - PM PERMS  
MPT6 - Acquisition Info Management (AIM)  
MPT9 - Logistics Transformation Automation Enablers/Future  
MPTA - PM GCSS-Army  
MPTB - DA Movement Management System  
MPTC - Standard Army Ammunition Management System  
MPTD - Standard Army Maintenance System  
MPTE - Logistics Post Production Software Support  
MPTF - Property Book User Supply-Enhanced  
MPTG - Unit Level Log System  
MPTH - Logistics Automation Systems  
MPTI - Single Army Logistics Enterprise (SALE)  
MPTM - Tactical Logistics Automation Integration and Sustainment  
MPTV - AHRS



MR1G - Power Reliability Enhancement Program  
MS10 - AMC Logistics System Operations  
MS2C - Inspector General Worldwide Net  
MS2E - Modern Aids to Planning Program  
MS31 - Logistics Support System Sustainment  
MS34 - Army Materiel Direct Log Support System  
MS35 - ADP FIELD Logistic System  
MS3A - Commodity Command Std System  
MS3E - Standard Depot System  
MS3H - Paperless Contracting  
MSB2 - Transportation Information Systems  
MT1G - TMDE Modernization  
MU1M - Visual Information Mission Support  
MU1P - Army-Wide Publishing  
MU2L - Records Management  
MXAM - Information Systems Support to AMC  
NGFB - OSACOM Administrative Support  
NGFR - Counterdrug OPTempo  
QATC - Air Traffic Control  
QDOC - Directorate of Contracting/Contracting Division  
QFMC - Financial Management Activities  
QLOG - Logistics Activities  
QLPR - Law Enforcement  
QPSM - Physical Security Matters  
QSEC - Directorate of Security  
RA11 - Small Arms  
RH04 - TRACTOR RIG/FLIP  
RJC6 - Physical Security Equipment  
RJC7 - Material Handling Equipment (MHE)  
RJC9 - Tactical Electric Power  
RJL4 - LOG Over the Shore (LOTS)  
RJL7 - Liquid Logistics (Fuel & Water) Equipment  
RJL8 - Army Water Modernization  
RJM1 - CSS LIFE SAVE  
RJM2 - TSG RDTE  
RJS2 - Combat Service Support Equipment  
RJT0 - Non-Tactical Vehicle (NTV)  
RJT2 - Trailers  
RJT7 - Trailers and Other Tactical Vehicles  
RK02 - Force Protection Technology  
RK03 - Medical Technology  
RK12 - Classified Technology  
RN13 - Base-Level Commercial Equipment  
SPAR - Readiness Spare Parts  
SPDP - TENCAP Sustainment  
SPGA - Sustain PM LH



SSSS - SSTS Soldier Support Systems  
STAC - SSTS Tactical / Cbt Vehs, Watercraft, Rail, Bridging  
TATT - Tech Fixes for Command Identified Training Problems  
TRJR - Junior ROTC  
TROE - ROTC Enhanced Skills Training  
TROT - Senior ROTC  
VABS - Soldier Media Center  
VALT - Army Logistics Innovation  
VAMP - Army Marketing Program  
VAVE - Value Engineering  
VBNK - Overseas Military Banking Program  
VBSA - Boy/Girl Scout Activity Support  
VCDE - CDE Implementation  
VCFO - Army Chief Financial Operations & Systems  
VCNA - Army Counterdrug Flying Hour Program  
VCND - Counter Narcotics/Demand Reduction  
VCNF - CNARC FAM MEM SUB AB  
VCNT - Counter Narcotics Program Accession Drug Testing  
VCNX - Counter Narcotics Pgm. Detection, Monitoring and Interdiction  
VCNY - Counter Narcotics Pgm. Detection, Monitoring and Interdiction - AR  
VCRF - FOREIGN Currency Fluctuation  
VDTS - Defense Travel System  
VFGN - US Army Parachute Team (Golden Knights)  
VFHM - Aviation Contract Services  
VFRA - Family Readiness Support Assistants (FRSA)  
VFSE - Field Food Service Equip  
VGFB - General Fund Enterprise Business System  
VHUR - Domestic Disasters  
VINA - Inauguration and Spirit of America  
VLCA - Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)  
VMER - Merge YR Accounts  
VMSS - HQDA MSS Program  
VONE - Expenditures for Operation Noble Eagle  
VPBE - Automation Support for PPB Development  
VPUB - Public Affairs  
VSLP - Strategic Logistics Program  
VTFS - FS Holding Account  
VTRS - Transportation Safety and Security  
VULB - Unified Legislative Budgeting  
VWR1 - Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-1/CONUS)  
VWR2 - Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-2/EUROPE)  
VWR3 - Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-3/AFLOAT)  
VWR4 - Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-4/Korea/Japan/Hawaii)  
VWR5 - Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-5/SWA)  
VWSI - War Reserve Secondary Items  
WAMC - AMC TOE Organizations



WCDE - Chemical Defense Equipment for MTO&E Units  
ZNET - Special Projects  
ZSFM - Reimbursable AWCF Supply Operations  
ZTII - II PEG Wedge  
ZZDF - National Program Office  
ZZSF - SSF MACOM Wedge for ZSFM (Reimb AWCF Sup Opns)

### **Personnel and Benefits**

A2MW - Second Destination Transportation MWR (Less AAFES)  
A2PC - Second Destination Transportation Civilian PCS  
A2UP - Second Destination Transportation Unit PCS Moves  
AF2S - FDT/Second Destination Transportation Subsistence  
ARFT - AR FTS AT/Above RRC  
FAPC - Community & Family Support Center  
HSDH - Defense Health Program  
MPT7 - AAC-IAA  
MPT8 - Personnel Transformation  
MS5A - ARMY CIVILIAN Personnel System  
MS5B - KEYSTONE Systems  
MS5C - Personnel Enterprise System-Automation (PES-A)  
MS5G - US MEPCOM Joint Computer Center  
MS5K - TOTAL ARMY Personnel Database  
MS6C - SIDPERS-USAR  
MS7Z - Force Management System  
MSAZ - Health Care MIS  
NG95 - FECA  
NGBL - Education Program  
PACS - PCS Travel  
PADH - Military Retiree Health Care Accrual Trust Fund-AC  
PAID - Enlisted Army Incentives  
PAMP - Pay and Allowances (Military Personnel)  
PAOT - Military Pay - Other  
PARC - BAH-RCI  
PARF - AC Subsistence  
QAAP - Family Readiness Initiatives and Programs  
QACS - Army Community Services  
QCCS - Child Development Services  
QCPO - Civilian Personnel Advisory Office (CPAC)  
QCYS - Child and Youth Services (CYS)  
QDEC - Commissary  
QDPC - Soldier Rec and Community Support  
QFMD - Family Member Substance Abuse  
QHFM - Unaccompanied Personnel Housing Management and Fur  
QPSG - Personnel Support  
QYDP - Youth Development Program  
TRVP - Veterans Education Assistance Program (VEAP)



V712 - PBD712 MILITARY To Civilian conversions  
VCAP - Army Career Alumni Program  
VCPR - Army Civilian Personnel Regionalization  
VHOA - Homeowners Assistance Program, Defense  
VINJ - Civilian Injury and Illness Compensation  
VINK - Federal Employees Compensation FECA  
VIRS - Army Recruiting & Retention Initiatives  
VMBH - Military Burial Honors  
VMTS - Public Transportation Benefit Program  
VPRN - OPM NACI Fingerprinting  
VRAE - Reception Stations  
VREM - Disp of Remains/POW-MIA  
VSIK - Subsistence-In-Kind  
VTSS - Subsistence Support Programs  
VUPC - Civilian Unemployment Compensation  
VWWP - Wounded Warrior Program  
VX01 - VSIP  
VX02 - Civilian Work Force Tax  
VX03 - 15% Remittance to CSRDF  
ZC12 - Transition Costs  
ZGRO - Growth of the Army  
ZK2C - Contractor to Civilian Conversions

### **Reserves**

AR1R - Reserve Component Equipment Modernization  
ARAM - Army Reserve Aviation Maintenance  
ARDM - USAR OTHER Maintenance  
ARDP - USAR NON-AMIM Distribution  
AREN - RC Enlisted Incentives  
ARFH - USAR Flying Hour Program  
ARFU - USAR Full Time Support  
ARIM - IMA Program  
ARIR - Army IRR Screening  
ARIT - USAR Institutional Training Support  
ARMC - Army Reserve MILCON  
ARNM - New Mission Minor Construction USAR  
ARP2 - USAR Surface OPTEMPO  
ARRR - USAR Recruiting, Retention and Family Support Program  
ARTM - USAR TDA Maintenance Support  
ARTR - Division Exercise Support  
DMDE - Mobilization Deployment Exercises  
DMMC - Mobilization Movement Control Technician  
DMNG - NG WARTRACE  
DMSP - MOBEX Support  
FAAR - Army Reserve - Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM)  
FANG - Field Activity National Guard



FAOB - USA Force Development Agency  
JCES - NCESGR  
MS6Z - HQ OCAR Core ADP  
MU1B - USAR IMMP  
MXAR - AR-PERSCOM Core ADP  
NG2H - NG Medical OPRED  
NG39 - NG Communications and Visual Information  
NG6H - RC Medical Readiness  
NG8T - NG Schools  
NGAT - NG Aviation Training Site Technology  
NGBA - National Guard Enhanced Separate Brigades  
NGBT - NG Real Property O&M For Training Sites  
NGCR - NG Pay Raise  
NGFH - NG Flying Hour Program  
NGHA - NG Operational Safety Health Agency  
NGLE - NG LCCS/CLS  
NGMC - NG Military Construction  
NGMD - NG Command Information  
NGMU - NG DEPOT Maintenance  
NGNP - NG Indirect-OPTEMPO  
NGP2 - Army National Guard Ground OPTEMPO  
NGPL - NG aviation Maintenance Activities  
NGPT - NG JCS Directed Exercises  
NGRA - NG Continuing Education Program  
NGRE - NG Recruiting and Retention  
NGRL - NG BASOPS OPRED  
NGRT - NG BASOPS  
NGST - NG Technician Pay for State Area Commands  
NGTP - ARNG Military Technicians  
NGTT - NG CTC Program  
PAAR - Pay and Allowances, Army Reserve  
PASN - NG SOF Military Pay  
PASR - SOF Military Pay USAR  
PNAG - NG PAY AGRS  
PNAT - NG PAY 15 Days Annual Training  
PNBE - ARNG Bonus Programs  
PNCD - NG Pay Career Development and Refresher and Proficiency Training  
PNID - NG Pay Inactive Duty Training  
PNRP - ARNG Retired Pay Accrual  
PNSP - NG Pay Student MOS  
PNSR - Military pay, ARNG for Special Operations Forces  
PNSU - ARNG Clothing & Subsistence  
PNTF - NG Pay Student IET  
PRAG - RC AGR Program  
PRAT - RC Pay and Allowances - Annual Training  
PRDH - Military Retiree Health Care Accrual Trust Fund-RC



PRID - RC Pay Inactive Duty Training  
PROI - RC Officer Incentives  
PRTF - RC Pay Student Initial Entry Training  
QRAR - Army Reserve RPMA CORE  
QRCS - reserve component support on installations  
TRAP - RC TDAP  
TRCS - Reserve Component Training Support  
TRIT - RC Initial Skills Training Attendance  
TRNC - RC Professional Development Schools  
TRNM - RC MOS Qualification Schools  
TROS - RC Overseas Deployment  
TRST - RC Sustainment Training  
TRTD - USAR Training Division  
TRUT - USAR FTS TRAINING  
VBGM - National Guard Borders Mission  
VBSP - Training RDS GRP (AC-RC)  
VCNG - NG Counternarcotics  
VRDG - DTL Training ASSC (AC-RC)  
VTXI - Title XI  
WRSQ - USAR Force Structure  
ZTRC - QDR Reserve Component Reduction

#### Transformation

A2FM - Second Destination Transportation Force Modernization/Recapitalization  
DA3O - Restructure & Future Force Support  
DA3S - STRYKER Facility Support  
DA3V - Aviation Transformation Facility Support  
DFFE - Field Force Engineering  
FL8D - Combat Support Medical  
FL8G - Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment  
FL8H - Army Logistics Tech Exploration  
FLTT - Other for Modernization Fielding  
FP EE - Aircrew Integrated Systems  
FPER - Comanche  
FPES - Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH)  
FPET - Light Utility Helicopter (LUH)  
FPFD - Engineer Support Equipment  
FPFK - Combat Service Support Central  
FPLI - Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM)  
FPLK - Missiles  
FPLS - Follow-On To Tow  
FPLW - Indirect Fire Protection Capability  
FPSM - Maneuver Ammunition System (MAS)  
FPSS - Future Combat Systems (FCS)  
FPST - Stryker  
FTRC - Advanced Combat Technologies



HS2K - MED FORCE 2000/Medical Re-engineering Initiative  
HSMR - Medical Combat Development  
JATT - Joint Army Training Transformation  
JDDS - Joint Deployment System Resources  
MU17 - Army Enterprise Architecture (AEA)  
MU1L - National Science Center  
NGNG - FORCE XXI  
PNRT - NET/DET Through 1997  
RA02 - Air Drop Equipment  
RA08 - Improved Recovery Vehicle (IRV)  
RA32 - Unmanned Ground Systems  
RA35 - C2 Vehicle  
RB14 - 105MM Ammunition  
RB21 - FA Ammunition Improvement  
RD16 - Air Traffic Control  
RD19 - Advanced Cargo Aircraft  
RF01 - Tactical Bridging  
RF02 - Countermines  
RF03 - Construction Equipment  
RF07 - Engineer Support Equip Misc  
RJS1 - Soldier Modernization  
RJT3 - Armored Security Vehicle  
RJT9 - Force Projection Outload  
RK01 - Research-Technology Base  
RK09 - Soldier Technology  
RK11 - Military Engineering Technologies  
RK13 - Rotorcraft Technology  
RK16 - Lethality Technology  
RK17 - Ground Vehicle Technology  
RK18 - JSSAP  
RK20 - Logistics Technology  
RK22 - Digitization S&T  
RL02 - Army Test Infrastructure  
RL03 - RDTE Management Activities  
RL04 - Test Analysis & Evaluation  
RL07 - Test and Evaluation Instrumentation  
RL08 - Technical Testing of Advanced, High-Technology Weapons Developments  
RL12 - Medical R&D Command RDTE Management  
RN04 - Manufacturing Technology  
VAWE - Advanced Warfighting Experiments  
VAWG - Asymmetric Warfare Group  
VOCE - ORG CLOTH/IND EQUIP  
VREF - Rapid Equipping Soldier Support  
VREO - Rapid Equipping Force (REF) Operations  
VRML - Army Logistics Transformation  
VS0A - Reference Target Development



VTRD - Combat Development Core  
VWPF - ODCS G-4 Transformation Support  
ZIAC - II PEG AC Modular Forces Incremental Costs  
ZMOD - PBD753 Modularity Wedge  
ZTAC - TT PEG AC Modular Forces Incremental Costs

**WMD**

FAOC - ARMY Nuclear & Chemical Agency  
FASP - Army Space/Missile Defense Command  
FLCE - Chemical Weapons Stockpile & Materiel Storage Program  
FPDG - Cruise Missile Defense  
FPFB - Air & Missile Defense Battle Management C4I (AMD BMC4I)  
FPQF - Terminal High-Alt Area Defense (THAAD)  
FPQG - Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)  
FPQS - JTAGS – Joint Tactical Ground Station  
HSCB - Medical NBC Defense  
RG04 - Protective Systems  
RL11 - Kwajalein Atoll  
VCHM - Chemical Demilitarization  
VCWT - Chemical and Biological Treaties  
VITI - Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Implementation  
VNMD - National Missile Defense  
VSUR - Army Biological Surety Program  
VTER - Antiterrorism  
VTRE - Conventional Arms Control Treaties  
VTSM - Strategic Arms Control Treaties  
VWMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction Domestic Response  
XCAP - Chemical ACT Pacific



## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> United States Army War College, *How the Army Runs – A Senior Leader Reference Handbook 2007 – 2008* (Carlisle: United States Army War College, 2007), 141.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 159.

<sup>3</sup> William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy For A New Century* (Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999), iii.

<sup>4</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, September 2001), 30.

<sup>5</sup> Richard B. Myers, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, March 2005), 3.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>7</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, March 2005), iv.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>10</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of The United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1999, March 2006), iii.

<sup>11</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, September 2001), v.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 43.

<sup>13</sup> Robert M. Gates, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, June 2008), 6.

<sup>14</sup> John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 21.

<sup>15</sup> Global Security, "Future Combat System", linked from the *Global Security Home Page* at "Military Menu," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/fcs.htm> (accessed October 13, 2009)

<sup>16</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Defense Contracting Integrity: Survey on Contractor Ethics Programs* (GAO-09-646SP, September 2009), an E-supplement to GAO-09-591

<sup>17</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army's Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address Implementation Challenges* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, August 2007), 2.



<sup>18</sup> Eric K. Shinseki, "Army Overview", lecture, Pentagon, Arlington, VA, October 2000.

<sup>19</sup> Stephen J. Gerras, Leonard Wong and Charles D. Allen, "Organizational Culture: Applying a Hybrid Model to the U.S. Army," *Strategic Leadership Selected Readings* (Academic Year 2010): 114.



